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INTRODUCTION 
Gregory Bright was barely 18 years old when the State of Louisiana 
charged him with second-degree murder.1 The prosecution based the 
charge on a sole piece of eyewitness testimony from a woman addicted to 
heroin and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia whom the police paid 
in exchange for her testimony.2 An adequately staffed and well-funded 
defense counsel easily could have won this case; Bright, however, like 
85% of Louisiana’s accused criminals, was indigent and could not afford 
to hire competent counsel.3 The court, therefore, appointed Bright a district 
public defender who interviewed no witnesses, conducted no discovery, 
and performed no investigation.4 Subsequently, the court sentenced Bright 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole.5 Twenty-seven years 
later, the Innocence Project overturned Bright’s conviction after the 
organization’s work revealed crucial evidence the public defender had 
failed to locate.6  
“Equal justice under law” is considered a stalwart of American 
democracy and is prominently inscribed on the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by MARY GRACE RICHARDSON. 
 1. Defending the Innocent, LA. PUB. DEFENDER BOARD, http://lpdb.la.gov 
/About/Defending%20the%20Innocent.php [https://perma.cc/A4L4-F4MF] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 2. Gregory Bright, INNOCENCE PROJECT NEW ORLEANS, http://www.ip-
no.org/exonoree-profile/gregory-bright [https://perma.cc/8BP9-5NNU] (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2018). 
 3. David Carroll, Louisiana’s Right to Counsel Problems Explained, SIXTH 
AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/louisianas-right-to-coun 
sel-problems-explained/ [https://perma.cc/RJ4U-BZ5D]; Defending the Innocent, 
supra note 1. 
 4. Defending the Innocent, supra note 1.  
 5. Bright was illiterate prior to entering jail, but taught himself to read and 
write and appealed his case to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Innocence 
Project New Orleans (“IPNO”) eventually took up the case. IPNO brought forth 
all the evidence the public defender failed to find in the first case, including 
several alibi witnesses. The Louisiana Supreme Court overturned Bright’s and his 
co-defendant’s convictions. On June 24, 2003, the prison released Bright and 
Truvia, his co-defendant. Bright spent nearly 27 years in prison for a crime he did 
not commit, and competent defense easily could have proven Bright’s innocence 
the first time. Id.; Gregory Bright, supra note 2.  
 6. Defending the Innocent, supra note 1; Gregory Bright, supra note 2.  
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Court building.7 Well-known indigent defense reformer Stephen Bright,8 
however, argues that “unless something changes, we’re going to have to 
someday blast ‘equal justice under law’ off the Supreme Court building.”9 
Bright argues the removal of this inscription is necessary because the 
indigent defendant has nothing resembling “equal justice under the law.”10 
Louisiana is synonymous with chronically underfunded and 
overworked public defenders.11 The state has these issues because of its 
unique and unstable funding model.12 Louisiana funds its public defenders 
on both the state and district level,13 but court fines on the district level 
generate the bulk of the funding.14 Although constitutionally secured 
through the Sixth Amendment, the indigent right to counsel has plagued 
Louisiana since the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright.15 In Gideon, the Court construed the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution to mandate an affirmative right to counsel 
to all indigent defendants charged with a felony.16 Post-Gideon, Louisiana 
has struggled to adequately provide for public defenders to represent the 
poorest in society.17 Unless the state secures a stable system of funding for 
Louisiana’s public defenders, justice will be guaranteed only for those who 
can afford it. 
                                                                                                             
 7. See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUP. CT., https:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx [https://perma.cc/9YPX-2U4M] 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018).  
 8. Stephen Bright bears no relation to Gregory Bright, mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph.  
 9. Lee Cowan, Unequal Justice Under the Law, CBS NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017, 
9:12 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/unequal-justice-under-the-law/ [https: 
//perma.cc/5723-5NJ8]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See generally Andrea M. Marsh, State of Crisis: Chronic Neglect and 
Underfunding for Louisiana’s Public Defense System, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. 
L. (2017), https://www.nacdl.org/louisianapublicdefense_report/ [https://perma 
.cc/K25X-4QXK]. 
 12. John Burkhardt, The Crisis in Public Defense Funding: The Approaching 
Storm & What Must Be Done, 62 LA. B.J. 360, 361 (Feb./Mar. 2015). 
 13. Louisiana has 42 judicial districts; each district is comprised of at least 
one parish. Maps of Judicial Districts, LA. SUP. CT., https://www.lasc.org 
/about_the_court/map01.asp [https://perma.cc/BG3S-UWAZ] (last visited Sept. 
24, 2018). 
 14. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361. 
 15. Id. at 361–62. 
 16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 17. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361–62. 
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This Comment proposes a new funding structure for Louisiana’s 
public defenders that eliminates budget shortfalls by substituting the 
current district-level user-pay system,18 in which all criminal defendants 
bear the cost of indigent defense through court fees and fines, for a 
centralized, state-funded general revenue stream. 
Part I of this Comment briefly explains the United States Supreme 
Court’s constitutional obligation mandated in Gideon v. Wainwright and 
discusses the application of Gideon in Louisiana. It focuses on problems 
posed by Louisiana’s distinctive and highly unstable public defender 
funding structure. Part II addresses proposed solutions to the funding 
crisis, ranging from broad criminal justice reform to smaller administrative 
reform initiatives. Part III focuses on Louisiana-specific needs for indigent 
defense funding and considers solutions tailored to those needs. Part IV 
concludes by proposing the ideal Louisiana solution of a state-centralized 
funding stream for indigent defense while addressing potential caveats and 
the future of indigent defense in the state.  
I. THIS IS HOW WE DO IT, WHERE I’M FROM19 
Louisiana is infamous for its unique traditions in government and 
politics,20 including the way the state funds indigent defense.21 Louisiana 
primarily funds public defenders through criminal conviction fees—the 
bulk of which are generated from traffic tickets.22 The current funding 
system is barely keeping the public defenders’ offices open, much less 
providing adequate counsel to the indigent defendant.23 Despite a 
constitutional mandate, Louisiana has consistently underfunded and 
disregarded public defenders since the Supreme Court’s decree in Gideon 
in 1963.24  
                                                                                                             
 18. This Comment uses “user-pay system” interchangeably with “district-
level court fine system” to describe Louisiana’s funding of indigent defense.  
 19. BIG TYMERS, This Is How We Do It, on BIG MONEY HEAVYWEIGHT (Cash 
Money Records 2003).  
 20. See generally WAYNE PARENT, INSIDE THE CARNIVAL: UNMASKING 
LOUISIANA POLITICS (La. State Univ. Press 2004). 
 21. Carroll, supra note 3.  
 22. Marsh, supra note 11, at 9–16. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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A. Gideon and Louisiana’s Attempt at Meeting its Requirements  
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution broadly 
proclaims, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”25 The Supreme 
Court, however, did not extend this provision to the states until 1963 in the 
landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright.26 Prior to Gideon, the Court 
declared the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be a fundamental right 
in Powell v. Alabama27 and, therefore, incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states as a fundamental Bill of Rights protection.28 Ten 
years after Powell, however, in Betts v. Brady,29 the Court held that the 
right to counsel was not a fundamental right, utilizing the same historical 
data as the Powell Court but reaching the opposite conclusion.30 The 
Gideon Court rectified this inconsistency by declaring the Sixth 
Amendment a fundamental right and overruling Betts, therefore applying 
the right to counsel to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.31 
In Gideon, the Supreme Court recognized the essential nature of the 
right to counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony.32 The 
Court stated the right to counsel was an “obvious truth” based on “reason 
and reflection . . . [that] any person haled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for 
him.”33 The Court later expanded the right to counsel to cover all crimes 
that deprive a defendant of his liberty, describing the right as a “requisite 
to the very existence of a fair trial.”34  
Although the Court interpreted a constitutional requirement, many 
have described Gideon’s decision as an unfunded mandate requiring states 
to provide attorneys to all indigent criminal defendants.35 Post-Gideon, 
states were forced to develop different solutions to comply with the 
                                                                                                             
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 27. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932). 
 28. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43. 
 29. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471–72 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963).  
 30. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340. 
 31. Id. at 342–43.  
 32. Id. at 342–44.  
 33. Id. at 344. 
 34. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1972). 
 35. Stephen Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford 
This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 687 (2010). 
594 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
expensive mandate. Many states did not devote adequate resources to the 
new requirement;36 Louisiana was one of them.37  
In the first 30 years post-Gideon, Louisiana implemented a highly 
unorganized system in which each judicial district controlled the 
supervision and distribution of funds to indigent defenders.38 The funding 
for Louisiana’s early program originated from a criminal conviction fee 
the Louisiana Legislature levied in 1966.39 The state legislature established 
local indigent defender boards (“IDB”) and charged local state judges to 
appoint members to the local boards.40 The local IDBs continued to 
provide services to indigent defendants without the benefit of state 
oversight until 1993.41 The bulk of public defense funding continued to 
derive from conviction fees and was later extended to include money 
collected from traffic ticket convictions.42 Despite the extension, the IDB 
“existed in a state of ‘chronic underfunding.’”43 In 1993, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court rebuked the state legislature for its failure to provide 
adequate funds and oversight to the district public defender and warned 
the legislature that lack of action would cause the court to intervene.44  
The Louisiana Legislature failed to heed the warning of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, prompting the court to create the Louisiana Indigent 
Defense Board (“LIDB”) in 1994.45 The LIDB kept the IDBs intact but 
created a statewide board to implement defense-delivery standards.46 By 
1997, the Louisiana Legislature finally acquiesced and embraced the 
board, changing the name to the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance 
Board (“LIDAB”) and provided the program with the state’s first-ever 
appropriation of funds for indigent defense services.47 Despite the 
statewide supplement, the LIDAB struggled with the same funding 
problems because local funding remained within the control of the IDBs 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. 
 37. Marsh, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 9. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 10.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. These defense-delivery standards established quality and performance 
standards for the district public defender. Id. 
 47. Richard Drew, Louisiana’s New Public Defender System: Origins, Main 
Features, and Prospects for Success, 69 LA. L. REV. 955, 966 (2009).  
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and varied depending on the size and population of the judicial district.48 
In addition to unstable local funding, the Louisiana Legislature refused to 
fully fund the LIDAB.49 In 1998, the LIDAB estimated a need of about 
$20 million, but the legislature appropriated only $5 million.50 By 2002, 
state and local funding could not cover indigent defense services in almost 
half of the judicial districts.51 
In 2007, the Louisiana Legislature—again amidst increasing call for 
reform—passed Act 307, establishing the state-centralized Louisiana 
Public Defender Board (“LPDB”) to provide equal and sufficient public 
defense throughout all judicial districts.52 One major benefit of the LPDB 
was a larger appropriation of state funds; nevertheless, the main source of 
indigent defense funding remained at the district level through conviction 
fees.53 The district public defender continued to control the conviction fees 
and could not disburse them to any other district or the LPDB.54 Despite 
the legislature’s noble intention, funding reform failed and indigent 
defense remained on the same uncertain fiscal foundation that caused 
previous reform efforts in Louisiana to fail.55  
B. Funding Structure of Louisiana Public Defenders 
Louisiana delivers funding to its public defenders on the state and 
district level through a user-pay system.56 A user-pay system is one in 
which the cost of indigent defense is spread among all criminal defendants 
through court fees and fines imposed on those found guilty.57 The court 
fees include both the application fee indigent defendants pay to secure a 
public defender and criminal conviction fees.58 Nearly two-thirds of 
                                                                                                             
 48. Marsh, supra note 11, at 10–11. 
 49. Id. at 11. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Louisiana granted the LPDB broad authority “over all aspects of the 
delivery of public defender services throughout the courts of the State of 
Louisiana.” LA. REV. STAT. § 15:147(A) (2018); Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 360.  
 53. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361. 
 54. Marsh, supra note 11, at 13. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361. 
 57. Id. 
 58. A $45 fee is levied on every criminal defendant who is “convicted after 
trial, pleads no contest, or who forfeits his or her bond for violation of a state 
statute or a parish or municipal ordinance other than a parking ticket.” Frank 
Neuner, The Funding Crisis in the Louisiana Public Defender System: Public 
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funding for indigent defense in Louisiana comes from these criminal 
conviction fees, specifically from traffic tickets.59  
The criminal conviction fee is shared among multiple parties, 
including the local district attorney, the sheriff, the clerk of court, the crime 
lab, and many other criminal justice related groups.60 The amount each 
party receives varies depending on the district and the type of crime, but 
the district attorney and sheriff are each guaranteed at least 12% of the 
fines.61 The remainder of the fines are disbursed to various criminal justice 
groups.62 The funding structure in Louisiana is collapsing under the weight 
of issues like the unequal distribution of funds among different districts, 
the decrease in traffic tickets, and the overall instability created by relying 
on a user-pay system.63  
Traffic ticket convictions are the most important part of the user-pay 
system because they represent 75% of each indigent defender’s district 
budget.64 Traffic tickets, however, have presented a new set of problems 
over the last decade, highlighting even greater volatility in Louisiana’s 
already unstable indigent-defense-funding model.65 Problems associated 
with traffic tickets include an unequal distribution of interstate and 
                                                                                                             
Defense Reform Has a Long Way to Go, 60 LA. B.J. 110, 112 (Aug./Sept. 2012); 
Marsh, supra note 11, at 20. 
 59. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361. 
 60. The groups that receive the criminal conviction fees include the Crime 
Victims Reparations Fund, the Crime Stoppers Organization, the Coroner, the Drug 
Abuse Education and Treatment Program, and more. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, THE 
COLLECTION OF COURT COSTS AND FINES 2–3 (2014), http://app.lla.state.la.us 
/PublicReports.nsf/0/EC68FCD9EFFA8AC486257CAE00699A86/$FILE/0003 
8BDE.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z9N-MXEZ]. 
 61. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:571.11 (2018); LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 60.  
 62. The legislature has failed to make a clear law explaining the distribution 
of fees to groups and has mainly left it discretionary based on the district. LA. 
LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 60. But the Public Defender is guaranteed $45 in all 
criminal convictions. LA. REV. STAT. §15:168. 
 63. Samantha Sunne, Louisiana Public Defenders Lose Key Source of Income 
as Prosecutors Divert Speeding Ticket Fines, ADVOCATE (July 31, 2017, 2:06 
PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_5ad996c6-
7623-11e7-a3f7-effbaf2e7ad1.html [https://perma.cc/6UBX-JMLT]. 
 64. John Simerman & Chad Calder, Louisiana at a Crossroad on Providing 
Poor with Access to Public Defenders in Criminal Cases, Funding the Program, 
ADVOCATE (Mar. 1, 2016, 4:09 AM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge 
/news/crime_police/article_70441639-c7b0-5c26-b97c-e47feb08f6b5.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/6WN9-XDHP]. 
 65. Sunne, supra note 63. 
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highways, decrease in overall traffic ticket convictions, and conflicting 
local police priorities.66 
Of the 42 judicial districts in Louisiana, 13 do not have a significant 
enough portion of the U.S. Interstate highways located within its district 
to collect traffic tickets.67 Interstate highways are more heavily populated 
roadways, which both local commuters and long-distance travelers use, 
increasing the potential for more traffic tickets as compared to other 
roadways.68 The disparity of interstate highways automatically puts 25% 
of judicial districts at a significant disadvantage.69 For example, Vernon, 
the 30th district, and St. Charles, the 29th district,70 have roughly the same 
population and number of criminal cases filed.71 The two districts, 
however, have significantly different indigent defense budgets.72 Vernon’s 
public defender’s office is in the midst of a budget shortfall and had to 
refuse new indigent clients; meanwhile, the St. Charles Parish public 
defender’s office operates with a sufficient budget and double the staff of 
Vernon.73 The explanation for this difference is simple: St. Charles Parish 
has Interstate 10 and two major highways—U.S. Highway 90 and 
Highway 61—running through its judicial district,74 whereas Vernon 
Parish only has U.S. Highway 171, and no interstate in its jurisdiction.75 
This disparity in funds shows that relying on traffic tickets to fund the 
indigent defender is inequitable and ineffective in guaranteeing the right 
to counsel.76 
Furthermore, traffic ticket convictions have been declining in 
Louisiana.77 Over the last five years, Louisiana has experienced a 30% 
                                                                                                             
 66. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See generally The Interstate Highway System, HISTORY.COM, http://www 
.history.com/topics/interstate-highway-system [https://perma.cc/SL7C-Z8GT] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018).  
 69. Sunne, supra note 63. 
 70. Maps of Judicial Districts, supra note 13.  
 71. The average total population in both St. Charles and Vernon Parishes is 
50,000, and the average number of criminal cases filed in both districts is 1,600. 
Simerman & Calder, supra note 64. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Vernon Parish, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ver 
non+Parish,+LA/@30.7606761,-93.1378046,9z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x863a59c0  
0aa74a7b:0xa9681f147d3c3df!8m2!3d31.1320009!4d-93.1779659 [https://perma. 
cc/KUZ7-EDVC] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 76. Simerman & Calder, supra note 64.  
 77. Sunne, supra note 63.  
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drop in traffic tickets handled in court.78 The decrease is based primarily 
on the district attorney’s traffic ticket diversion program.79 The pre-trial 
diversion program allows the offender to pay an increased sum of money 
to the district attorney’s office in exchange for avoiding a criminal 
conviction.80 The clearance of a conviction allows the offender to avoid 
the necessary report to his insurance company and the corresponding 
premium hike.81 The local district attorney also benefits from the program 
because he receives the entirety of the fine without dividing the money 
among the multiple agencies that normally receive a share of the 
conviction fees.82 The effect of the decline of traffic tickets on the public 
defender’s budget is staggering; the LPDB calculated in 2014 that the 
decrease in conviction fees from 2009 to 2014 resulted in nearly a $9.2 
million loss to public defender offices.83 
The diversion program also highlights inequity between the District 
Attorney and the district public defender.84 The Louisiana District 
Attorneys’ budget is already significantly larger than the public defenders’ 
budget.85 Louisiana’s public defense spending in 2014 totaled $63 million 
while the district attorney spent almost double that amount at $122 
million.86  
In addition to the problems created by the diversion program, the 
public defender lacks control to secure a certain number of traffic tickets. 
Control of dispensing tickets remains within the purview of local police 
officers and parish sheriffs.87 Each police department has its own safety 
concerns and budgetary restraints, and may not be able to dedicate a 
substantial portion of its staff to the collection of traffic tickets.88 For 
example, Orleans Parish does not have a traffic diversion program but has 
                                                                                                             
 78. In some parishes, the number is even greater. For example, Calcasieu Parish 
saw a 42% decrease in traffic tickets processed in court from 2011 to 2012. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Julie O’Donoghue, District Attorneys Traffic Ticket Programs Cause 
Public Defenders to Lose Money: report, NOLA.COM (Aug. 1, 2017), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/08/public_defender_funding_crisis.
html [https://perma.cc/2ANE-3JJF].  
 82. Id.; see supra Part I.B.  
 83. A Review of Public Defense Funding in Louisiana, LA. PUB. DEFENDER 
BOARD, http://files.lsba.org/documents/CJC/PublicDefenderFundingPP.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/3QQW-98VB] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).  
 84. Marsh, supra note 11, at 21. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Carroll, supra note 3.  
 88. Burkhardt, supra note 12, at 361. 
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still seen a decrease in traffic tickets since 2008, largely because of the 
lack of resources and understaffing in the New Orleans Police 
Department.89 Regardless of local police department’s budgetary and 
staffing priorities, the public defender must still represent all indigent 
defendants, therefore, a stable indigent defense funding solution must be 
implemented.90 
Louisiana public defenders are tasked with representing 85% of 
defendants convicted of crimes.91 The public defenders’ job becomes even 
more difficult when supported by an inadequate funding mechanism.92 The 
answer to Louisiana’s funding crisis must involve multiple innovative 
solutions to provide the indigent defendant with constitutionally sufficient 
services. These solutions must include cooperation and coordination on 
the local, state, and national level, as one solution would be unable to fully 
stabilize Louisiana’s indigent defense budget. 
II. GO P-D, ’CAUSE THAT’S MY P-D: 
POTENTIAL FIXES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM93 
Two categories describe the potential solutions to solving Louisiana 
public defenders’ funding crisis: broad criminal justice reform and smaller 
solutions based on administrative changes. Many indigent defense 
reformers advocate for a federal solution.94 Litigation-focused solutions, 
however, are not discussed as this Comment focuses exclusively on the 
most practical solutions.95 The first set of solutions discussed are 
                                                                                                             
 89. Jessica Williams, Cash grabs, decline in ticket revenue leave New Orleans 
Traffic Court with dire $2.1M deficit, ADVOCATE (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www 
.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_4aa4a6c2-6e1f-11e6-ace0-7be  
149a87f2e.html [https://perma.cc/6SF9-N6X6]; Sunne, supra note 63.  
 90. See supra Part I.A.  
 91. Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485165/ 
[https://perma.cc/74JF-T6K6]. 
 92. Marsh, supra note 11, at 16. 
 93. See generally LIL WAYNE, Go D.J., on THA CARTER (Cash Money 
Records 2004). 
 94. Sara Mayeux, Gideon v. Wainwright in the Age of a Public Defense 
Crisis, TALK POVERTY (May 9, 2016), https://talkpoverty.org/2016/05/09/gideon-
wainwright-age-public-defense-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/M3GM-76S5].  
 95. Litigation has played a vital role in funding and reforming public 
defenders’ budgets throughout the United States. Currently, the Southern Poverty 
Law Center is suing Louisiana’s public defenders on behalf of eight different 
indigent defendants; however, litigation reform of public defense will not be 
addressed in this Comment due to the complexity of the issue. Litigation as a tool 
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comprehensive measures that aim to reform the criminal justice system as 
a whole in order to properly address the indigent defense funding crisis. 
A. Solutions Based on Broader Criminal Justice Reform 
The United States is a society of mass incarceration.96 Since the 
imposition of Gideon’s mandate in 1963, the criminal justice system has 
exploded.97 In 1963, federal and state prisons incarcerated 217,000 people; 
today those same prisons house approximately 2.3 million people.98 
Louisiana has the second highest per capita incarceration rate in the United 
States, with 712 residents imprisoned for every 100,000—nearly double 
the national average.99 Louisiana spends over $3.5 billion annually to 
maintain the largest per capita prison population in the world.100 The 
majority in Gideon could not have foreseen such drastic growth in the 
prison population; Gideon’s holding, however, remains a constitutional 
requirement to provide the indigent defendant with counsel.101 Many 
reformers have suggested the only way to accurately solve the indigent 
                                                                                                             
for reform in indigent defense must be discussed in isolation to fully develop each 
facet. See Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Officers 
Are Suing–and Starting to Win, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal 
.com/magazine/article/the_gideon_revolution [https://perma.cc/73WG-JQ4T]. 
 96. Thomas Giovanni & Roopal Patel, Gideon at 50: Three Reforms to Revive 
the Right to Counsel, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 3 (2013), http://www.brennan 
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defender funding crisis is to engage in broader criminal justice reform 
throughout Louisiana.102  
1. Reclassifying Misdemeanors as Fine Crimes 
One proposal many reform activists support is simply to “decreas[e] 
the need for public defenders” by reclassifying the punishment for minor, 
nonviolent misdemeanors as fine crimes.103 The Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel attaches only to crimes that involve imprisonment,104 but no 
similar requirement exists for crimes that merely impose a fine as a 
punishment.105 In the era of mass incarceration, many minor offenses have 
been over-criminalized, placing an even greater workload on the public 
defender.106 A declassification of minor misdemeanors would decrease 
significantly the number of cases the public defender is required to 
handle.107  
Reclassifying misdemeanors may decrease the overall workload for 
public defenders, but it also places a substantial financial burden on 
indigent defendants.108 Some activists have referred to decriminalization 
as “repackaging punishment for poor people”109 because it has the greatest 
effect on the poor.110 Defendants with the means to pay the fine attached 
to the crime have ample opportunity to do so, but courts usually send 
defendants who cannot afford to pay the fine to jail,111 perpetuating the 
cycle for public defenders.112  
A way to ensure both indigent defendants and public defenders both 
benefit from this reform is to ensure that states’ decriminalization statutes 
include certain provisions.113 Specifically, the provisions must ensure no 
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arrest, no jail time, and a limited criminal record for a defendant convicted 
of a fine crime.114 For example, in 2008, Massachusetts decriminalized the 
possession of an ounce or less of marijuana.115 Today, instead of imposing 
jail time, the offender pays a civil penalty of $100 to the city in which the 
offense was committed and forfeiture of the marijuana.116 The text of the 
bill specifically prohibits imposing any other “form of penalty, sanction or 
disqualification” on the offender, and the bill offers no specific punishment 
for failure to pay the civil penalty.117 Despite decriminalization’s flaws, 
most notably the greater burden on poor defendants, decriminalization 
reforms can alleviate some of the strain on the system, the defendant, and 
the public defender.118 
2. Reexamining Sentencing Provisions 
A further way to engage in broader criminal justice reform is to reduce 
prison sentences that courts impose on offenders.119 Systemically reduced 
sentences would decrease the overall burden on prisons, freeing money 
spent on prison administration for use by the underfunded public 
defender.120 The Louisiana Legislature can also abolish mandatory 
minimum sentences and three-strike laws, which sentence people charged 
with their third crime to life in prison.121 In the 1990s, New York removed 
mandatory minimums for most drug crimes and gave judges sentencing 
discretion.122 As a result, the country heralded New York as an effective 
leader in reducing the state’s criminal justice budget and incarceration 
rates—seeing a 10% reduction in prison population from 1995 to 2007—
                                                                                                             
 114. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1109–14 (2015). 
 115. Keriann Speranaza, The Effects of Massachusetts’ Decriminalization of 
Marijuana Law on Use Patterns, 7 UNDERGRADUATE REV. 101, 101–02 (2011). 
 116. Id.  
 117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2018). 
 118. See generally Natapoff, supra note 114.  
 119. Uphoff, supra note 104, at 676.  
 120. Id. at 676.  
 121. For example, in Louisiana, if an offender possessed or used a firearm in 
the commission of certain violent felonies the court must sentence the offender to 
a minimum of ten years. If the offender discharged the firearm during the 
commission of the violent felony, the court must impose a 20-year mandatory 
minimum sentence. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893.3 (2018). Uphoff, supra 
note 104, at 676.  
 122. Jackie Rothenberg, For State Prisons, West Isn’t Best, 95 A.B.A. J. 15 
(Dec. 2009). 
2018] COMMENT 603 
 
 
 
as the rest of the United States saw a significant increase in prison 
population during that same period.123  
Opponents to reducing prison sentences argue that public safety 
warrants locking up habitual offenders; nevertheless, the “public safety” 
notion is largely a myth.124 Nearly 80% of inmates in Louisiana are 
nonviolent offenders who could benefit from rehabilitation or reduced 
sentencing rather than imprisonment.125 Sentence reduction is the most 
cost-effective method of criminal justice reform and would reduce the 
overall burden on the criminal justice system.126 Instead of spending more 
funds on prison maintenance, Louisiana should reevaluate its criminal 
justice priorities—such as rehabilitation and adequate representation for 
all criminal defendants—and adjust its massive criminal justice budget to 
match those priorities.127 
3. Abolishing the Death Penalty 
In addition to reforming sentences and punishments on certain crimes, 
the Louisiana Legislature should replace the death penalty with a more 
cost-effective measure.128 The death penalty remains one of the most 
substantial monetary burdens on Louisiana’s criminal justice system.129 
Although Louisiana has not completed a study on the cost of the death 
penalty, other states’ studies serve as sufficient comparative models.130 For 
example, a study in Oregon found that of 61 death penalty cases, the 
average cost on taxpayers was $2.3 million per case, including costs of 
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incarceration.131 In comparison, the same Oregon study found that of 313 
aggravated murder cases, for which the punishment was life without 
parole, the average cost was $1.4 million, nearly a million dollars less.132  
A significant portion of taxpayer money spent on death row inmates 
is dedicated to the criminal trial and post-conviction appellate process.133 
The same Oregon study found that after removing the cost of incarceration 
and focusing solely on the cost to prosecute and defend such a case, a death 
penalty case still costs taxpayers an average of $1.4 million, while life 
without parole only costs $334,522, an 80% cost difference.134 Although 
Oregon and Louisiana do not bear the same demographics, the study 
demonstrates the wide cost margin between a death penalty case and a life-
without-parole case.135  
Louisiana currently has 74 people on death row, and based on the 
current number of indigent defendants in Louisiana, approximately 63 of 
those inmates require assistance from the public defender.136 The total 
burden of the indigent death row inmates on the state public defender is 
greatly out of proportion with the public defender’s total budget.137 The 
state public defender spends over one-third of its total annual state general 
revenue—nearly $10 million—on litigating death penalty cases.138 Six 
million dollars is reserved for trial-level capital representation, and the 
remaining four million dollars is spent on appellate and post-conviction 
representation.139  
The average public defender does not have the time or resources to 
adequately defend a death penalty case, but the state is still required to 
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provide the indigent charged in a death penalty case with counsel.140 
Because of the requirement, the LPDB must contract out most of the death 
penalty cases to nonprofits and private firms.141 The LPDB generously 
compensates the nonprofits and private firms, placing a hefty burden on 
the LPDB budget.142 Criminal justice reform activists urge abolishment of 
the death penalty, advocating that doing so will save Louisiana millions of 
dollars in litigation fees and create a more stable criminal justice and 
public defender budget.143 Additionally, research has shown the death 
penalty does not create a safer society.144 The death penalty imposes a 
significant strain on an already failing indigent defense budget, and 
Louisiana should abolish it to better allocate public defense resources.145 
B. Solutions Based on Administrative Changes 
Broad reforms, such as abolishing the death penalty, are not the only 
way to solve Louisiana’s indigent defense funding crisis.146 Incremental 
and small-scale solutions can effect great change.147 These potential 
solutions, hereinafter referred to as “administrative solutions,” require 
either the state or federal government to modify existing programs to 
increase their effectiveness. 
1. Funding Proportional to Caseloads 
The Brennan Center for Justice, a non-partisan law and policy think 
tank,148 recommends making state indigent defense funding proportional 
to public defenders’ caseloads.149 As an example, New York City courts 
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limit public defenders to the American Bar Association standard150 of 150 
felonies or 400 misdemeanors per attorney per year.151 The New York state 
legislature increased funding to achieve the caseload standards and hired 
more attorneys.152 The Brennan Center proposes states go beyond New 
York’s example and both establish caseload standards and make funding 
proportional to those standards in the same legislative initiative.153 Under 
the Brennan Center’s recommendation, a state would fund public 
defenders as long as they did not exceed caseload standards, creating a 
heightened incentive to meet those standards.154  
Louisiana promulgated its own caseload standards under the LIDB in 
1994155 of either 450 misdemeanors per year or 200 felonies per year,156 
but these standards are largely ignored because of the lack of funds and 
attorneys.157 The average Louisiana public defender caseload in 2015 was 
2.36 times the state’s caseload standard.158 The benefit of establishing 
caseload standards in proportion to funding is the decreased workload on 
the district public defender.159 Louisiana is infamous for its overworked 
public defenders; therefore, incentivizing public defenders to meet a 
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caseload standard would ensure adequate service for indigent 
defendants.160  
One of the complications of making funds dependent on compliance 
with caseload standards is that a lack of service to all indigent 
defendants—and therefore a lack of constitutionally guaranteed Sixth 
Amendment protections—would result.161 There simply will not be 
enough attorneys to match the ABA’s caseload requirement or the funds 
to hire new attorneys to meet those limits.162 Lawmakers would have to 
significantly increase funding for indigent defense to achieve this 
proposed reform.163 Louisiana must first prioritize a stable source of 
funding for public defenders, and then the LDPB can work to achieve 
attainable caseload standards.164 
2. JAG Grants—Distribution and Eligibility 
Greater organization and application of federal grant money within the 
LPDB would provide another solution to the current indigent funding 
crisis. The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“JAG”) 
program provides the largest amount of federal criminal justice resources 
to state and local jurisdictions.165 The program provides states with the 
resources necessary to fund law enforcement, prosecution, court 
programs, prevention and education, corrections, and much more.166 
Congress is permitted to spend up to $1.095 billion per year for the 
program, but Congress has not dedicated that level of funding to the 
program in over a decade.167  
Congress awards the funds via a base allocation to each state; 
lawmakers can enhance the funding depending on two factors: the 
population of the state and the amount of violent crime within the state.168 
The state then allocates 60% of the funding to the state government and 
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40% of the funding to local governments.169 In each state, the governor or 
other chief officer must appoint an agency to distribute the JAG funds.170 
In Louisiana, the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement 
(“LCLE”)171 is tasked with administering JAG funds in Louisiana and 
many other federal grants on both the state and local level.172  
Distribution of federal funds is problematic due to the inadequate 
representation of district public defenders on state commissions tasked 
with distributing the grant money.173 LCLE currently has 55 members.174 
Of those 55, however, nearly half are sheriffs and police chiefs, and 7 more 
are local district attorneys, many of whom have interests in opposition to 
those of the indigent defender.175 Only the state public defender serves as 
a clear advocate of the public defender on the LCLE.176 District public 
defenders must be given a greater voice in the LCLE in order to ensure 
parity in distribution of JAG funds and other federal grants. Parity is 
essential because the current system benefits law enforcement and 
prosecution, leaving the indigent defendant with little help from the federal 
government.177 To remedy the under-representation problem, the Brennan 
Center recommends the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) require state 
agencies like the LCLE to have equal representation of the criminal justice 
community.178 
The state’s law enforcement and district attorney advocates are likely 
to push back against public defenders when they campaign for greater 
representation.179 The sheriffs and the district attorneys benefit from 
overrepresentation on the LCLE by ensuring the commission hears and 
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funds their goals and priorities.180 For example, one of the most recent 
federal grants the LCLE received focuses on the accessibility of federal 
and state criminal history records, a grant that greatly benefits both the 
sheriffs and district attorneys.181 This pushback from the sheriffs and 
district attorneys, however, must not deter the legislature from providing 
adequate representation to all members of the criminal justice community 
on the LCLE because the imparity of federal grants is just one of many 
reasons the Louisiana public defender is starved for cash.182 The Louisiana 
Legislature should revise the legislation behind the LCLE to guarantee that 
there are as many public defenders as district attorneys on the commission 
to ensure that prosecutors and district public defenders are playing on a 
level field, providing an opportunity for an increase in public defenders’ 
funding.183  
3. Tap into Private Resources 
Effective utilization of members of the private bar and law students is 
the third and final administrative solution.184 Although Louisiana’s district 
public defenders’ offices are forced to restrict services because of the 
severe lack of funding, indigent defendants still need representation.185 
Private attorneys, therefore, receive judicial appointments in order to 
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satisfy the state’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel requirement.186 
Court-appointed private lawyers187 usually have little or no experience in 
criminal defense.188 The Louisiana State Bar Association should 
encourage law firms to send associate attorneys to complete externships at 
local public defender offices.189 Some New York City and Atlanta law 
firms use a similar and successful program.190 The Brennan Center 
recommends that all major law firms across the country adopt comparable 
programs, noting the benefits for both the law firm and the public 
defender.191 The law firm gains associates who receive a vast amount of 
trial and litigation experience in a short amount of time and meet pro bono 
quotas set by the state bar association sets, and the public defender receives 
an invaluable free resource.192 
To ensure an efficient and successful program, the externship must be 
tailored to litigators.193 Additionally, the program should target the most 
deprived district defender offices, relieving the burden on inexperienced 
private Louisiana attorneys appointed by a local judge at random.194 The 
externship program could solve both short-term and long-term staffing and 
funding goals, and although the solution proposes no new increase to state 
funding for indigent defense, the added workforce would greatly aid the 
Louisiana public defender.195  
Future attorneys must also learn the value and importance of pro bono 
work; one way for them to learn is to require pro bono hours as a 
prerequisite for completing the bar application.196 The ABA’s Model Rule 
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6.1 strongly recommends that every lawyer participate in at least 50 hours 
of pro bono legal service every year.197 In 2012, New York became the 
first state to require all bar applicants to complete 50 hours of qualifying 
pro bono service prior to submitting the bar application.198 Louisiana 
should join New York in requiring pro bono hours as a prerequisite for the 
bar application; instilling in young attorneys the importance of serving 
those in need of legal aid.199  
An additional way to engage future attorneys in indigent defense work 
is to utilize law students with an interest in litigation and knowledge of 
criminal procedure to aid the local public defender.200 Law schools should 
create an indigent defense clinic that requires all law students to participate 
in the clinic to satisfy graduation requirements.201 The ABA currently 
recommends that all law schools provide students the opportunity to work 
in pro bono legal work, but there is no per se mandate.202 Most law schools 
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which students do not receive academic credit, Standard 302(b)(2) does 
not preclude the inclusion of credit-granting activities within a law 
school's overall program of pro bono opportunities so long as law-related 
non-credit bearing initiatives are also part of that program. 
ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, A.B.A. (2007), https://www.amer 
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offer public interest externship programs in which students receive course 
credit for working in the local public defender’s office or other non-profit 
legal programs.203 To fully staff and serve the public defender, all 
Louisiana law schools should make a commitment to serving indigent 
defendants within their communities by requiring clinic hours. 
An indigent-defense clinic benefits the law students, the law school, 
and most importantly, indigent defendants.204 Law students would not only 
gain useful skills such as trial experience and client interaction, but also 
fulfill necessary ABA experimental learning requirements.205 For the 
indigent defendants, the free counsel law students offer under the 
supervision of law professors and attorneys serves as a vital resource that 
might otherwise be unavailable.206 
Admittedly, not all law students have a future in criminal law or even 
litigation, so requiring all students to participate in such a program could 
prove less helpful to some students.207 Schools could make the programs 
universally useful by not requiring every student to receive course credit 
in the clinic, but rather have every student serve a role in the clinic, even 
if it is a minor one, such as mandatory volunteer hours for legal research 
and writing to benefit the clinic.208 The hours would satisfy the mandatory 
participation requirement for graduation and also give students pro bono 
experience to enhance their resumes.209 
An indigent-defense clinic is an expensive undertaking, but funding is 
available through a variety of sources including the local bar association, 
federal and state grant money, and existing experimental structures within 
law schools.210 Moreover, law schools in the same city, such as Southern 
University and Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, can 
work together to create a shared clinic to assist the indigent defendant 
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more effectively. The schools can then equally share the costs of running 
the clinic and assist more indigent clients. 
C. The Federal Option 
Most of the potential solutions discussed are focused at the state level; 
indigent defense reformers, however, have also advocated for federal 
government assistance since Gideon’s mandate.211 A possible federal 
solution involves the creation of a federal agency tasked with 
supplementing the states’ indigent defense budget.212 Nearly 40 years ago, 
the ABA’s Committee on Legal and Indigent Defendants proposed the 
National Center for Defense Services, a centralized federal agency tasked 
with enhancing states’ indigent defense budgets.213 In 2013, the 50th 
anniversary of Gideon, the ABA reaffirmed its desire for this centralized 
and supplemental funding scheme for public defenders in Resolution 
104A.214  
The National Center for Defense Services under the ABA’s model 
would function as a non-profit entity and would set minimum standards 
that state indigent defenders must meet in order to receive federal 
funding.215 The ABA justified the proposal by stating “[it was] unfair to 
place upon the local government the entire burden of meeting the Supreme 
Court’s mandate,” adding that “state and local governments cannot solve 
the problem alone.”216 Adopting federal oversight would implement 
uniform standards that all public defenders must follow in order to receive 
federal aid.217 Federal funding would also provide for better research, 
training, and oversight for state public defenders who currently can barely 
afford to stay open, much less fund research.218 One scholar recently 
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estimated that a congressional designation of $4 billion would nearly triple 
indigent defender resources across the country.219 
England has “the most comprehensive system of state-funded legal 
assistance to criminal suspects and defendants in the world,” and serves as 
the best example of a national government funding indigent defense.220 
England’s system ensures that public defenders provide quality service to 
defendants by requiring certain accreditation standards for public 
defenders and implementing higher authority’s random peer review of 
case files.221 Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s government assures 
counsel of payment through a variety of methods, including: special 
negotiated contracts for complex cases; providing greater compensation to 
those that perform excellent service; and setting fees based on the time 
constraints the case will put on the public defender.222  
Despite all the benefits, there are a several obstacles to the federal 
option.223 First, proponents of federalism argue that the United States is 
quite different from the United Kingdom, and the American system thrives 
with the potential for 50 different solutions to fund public defenders.224 
Federalist proponents advocate for state autonomy in an area they consider 
traditionally governed by the states.225 Second, potential problems arise 
when deciding how the federal government will fund such a program.226 
Taxpayers argue that they do not want more of their federal income tax 
allocated to an area the states generally fund.227 All 50 states have 
struggled with the implementation of Gideon’s mandate, and each could 
benefit greatly from federal government aid; however, opponents to 
federal intervention are unlikely to support such a measure.228 The 
government can solve indigent defense funding in a myriad of ways, and 
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Louisiana must consider each option to implement the most effective 
solution.  
III. LOUISIANA ’BOUT TO BOUNCE BACK, BOUNCE BACK229 
Given Louisiana does not give public defenders an adequate budget to 
provide services to the indigent defendant, the state legislature should 
consider both federal and state-level solutions to solving this crisis.230 In 
2016, the Louisiana public defense system oversaw nearly 230,000 
cases231 on a budget of about $50 million in combined state and local 
revenue.232 The total cost of handling these cases exceeded the budget by 
nearly $1.3 million,233 and 19 districts faced a budget deficit.234 In the 
spring of 2016, the lack of funds forced 33 of Louisiana’s 42 public 
defender districts to restrict services.235 Restriction of services is a protocol 
the LPDB enforces when a district defender’s office has a budget deficit 
in which all cost-cutting measures are considered—including refusing 
capital cases, nonessential staff layoffs, and cancellation of private firm 
contracts.236 Implementation of the protocol places the indigent defendant 
on a waitlist, and the state allocates spots on the waitlist based on factors 
such as severity of the case and length of incarceration.237 Restriction of 
services has severe constitutional implications, but failure to follow the 
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protocol forces the district defender to stretch counsel to an excessive 
amount of defendants, thereby failing almost all indigent defendants.238  
The Louisiana Legislature attempted to temporarily remedy the 
funding problem in 2016 by increasing the funds required through District 
Assistance Fund (“DAF”) grants from 50% to 65%.239 DAF is part of the 
state general revenue to public defense and serves as supplemental funding 
to the neediest judicial districts.240 Although the new allocation of money 
will temporarily stabilize the budget by providing the necessary funds to 
make insolvent districts solvent, the DAF increase is a short-term solution 
to a looming crisis.241 Louisiana requires a single and stable source of 
indigent defense funding to create equitable delivery of public defense 
services.242 
A. Infeasible Solutions 
Louisiana requires unique, state-specific solutions to solve the current 
funding problem because of the extent of the crisis;243 the ideal solution is 
a hybrid approach that combines certain aspects of the above-proposed 
solutions.244 Solutions that are overly simplistic or that fail to consider the 
realities of indigent defense reform in Louisiana are not feasible due to the 
complexity of the problem and the unique politics of the state.245  
1. Abolishing the Death Penalty 
Abolishing the death penalty in Louisiana would free up a significant 
portion of the LPDB’s budget; however, even a significant budget 
reduction of 80% has thus far failed to convince a conservative state to 
abolish the death penalty.246 Admittedly, change regarding the death 
penalty may be on the horizon.247 Lawmakers introduced two bills in 2017, 
in both the House and Senate of the Louisiana Legislature, proposing the 
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abolishment of the death penalty.248 Although the Senate bill advanced 
through committee—the furthest such a measure has advanced in 
Louisiana—one vote narrowly defeated the House bill in committee.249 
The Senate bill was subsequently abandoned after the failure of the House 
bill, but the recent debate in the legislature signals that the abolishment of 
the death penalty could happen soon.250  
The legislature has implemented other reforms that citizens once 
thought impossible, indicating the abolition of the death penalty could also 
become reality.251 For now, Louisiana needs more time and political 
pressure; abolition of the death penalty remains a potential solution to 
increase funding for the indigent defender in the future.252 
2. Funding Proportional to Caseloads253 
Another infeasible solution for Louisiana is the implementation of 
caseload standards in connection to funding for indigent defense.254 The 
ABA recently conducted a study, the Louisiana Project, on the workload 
of Louisiana’s public defenders and found that in order to comply with 
workload standards the study set out,255 the state would need to hire over 
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1,406 full-time attorneys.256 The current level of funding provided on both 
the state and district level allows for only 21% of the attorney capacity the 
Louisiana Project recommends.257 Realistically, Louisiana cannot afford 
to intertwine the unattainable workload standards the ABA proscribes 
without funding for the program.258 Once the state dedicates a stable 
source of general state revenue to public defense, implementation of 
caseload standards is feasible; but currently, Louisiana has too many 
indigent defendants and too little money to use this reform.259 Louisiana 
should not disregard this goal, however, and the LPDB must continue to 
encourage all district defenders to manage workable standards.260 
3. The Federal Option 
The federal solution is also infeasible. Although the creation of a 
Center for Defense Services would aid the indigent defense crisis 
nationally, Congress has not shown an interest in legislatively addressing 
this issue.261 Senator Ted Kennedy first proposed legislation in Congress 
in 1979 after the ABA’s initial proposal.262 The legislation mirrored the 
ABA proposal in seeking to establish a permanent federal agency to 
distribute grants and enforce minimum standards, but the bill never gained 
any traction and died in committee.263 Democratic Congressman Ted 
Deutch introduced similar legislation in 2013, but the bill also died in 
committee in 2014.264 Various sessions of Congress have opposed 
government intervention into the state public defenders’ budgets mainly 
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because of lack of attention for the issue.265 Such a bill will not pass 
without pressure from the American public on their legislators.266  
While the divisive and partisan political climate suggests that the 
federal solution will not become reality, citizens may support the creation 
of a National Center for Defense Services in the future.267 A new 
administration, different ideological balance in Congress, or increased 
social pressure could significantly influence federal reform of indigent 
defense funding.268 Despite the current infeasibility of a federal option, 
caseload standards, and abolishment of the death penalty, these options are 
possible for Louisiana in the future; however, the state must implement 
realistic and immediate solutions to fix the indigent defense budget.  
B. Feasible Solutions 
Several solutions to the indigent defense funding crisis are feasible for 
Louisiana.269 The passage of a large criminal justice reform bill in 2017 
ushered in a new era for Louisiana.270 Broad criminal justice reform should 
not stop with reduction of sentences but should continue with 
reclassification of certain nonviolent misdemeanors into fine crimes to 
decrease the burden on indigent defenders.271 Additionally, the state 
should focus on the front-end of criminal justice reform by fully funding 
its indigent defense system.272 If the goal is truly justice, then reform 
should include those charged with a crime rather than only those already 
convicted.273 
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1. Reclassifying Misdemeanors  
Louisiana sought to relinquish the title as the incarceration capital of 
the world in 2017 by passing a comprehensive criminal justice reform 
bill.274 The legislation is expected to reduce Louisiana’s large prison 
population by 10% and save the state over $260 million over the next ten 
years.275 This bipartisan criminal justice reform signals the Louisiana 
Legislature’s willingness to consider reforming the indigent defense 
system to establish a more equitable and cost-efficient system.276  
The criminal justice legislation created a felony task force dedicated 
to examining Louisiana’s felonies and dividing them into a new class 
system based on the seriousness of the offense.277 The legislature should 
create a similar task force for misdemeanors in order to reclassify certain 
nonviolent misdemeanors into fine crimes.278 The misdemeanor task-force 
should begin with an overhaul of harsh first-time drug offender laws, 
under which a first-time marijuana possessor, for example, can face up to 
six months in jail.279 Lawmakers should eliminate the jail-time provisions, 
maintain the fine requirement, and establish a community service or drug 
treatment provision.280 In addition, lawmakers should designate certain 
nonviolent property crimes as fine crimes with a community service 
provision281 and reclassify certain misdemeanors as fine and community-
service crimes to decrease the need for a public defender.282 The 
legislature’s attempt at reclassifying felonies is an important step, but it 
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should only be the first step in Louisiana’s long road to criminal justice 
reform.  
2. Reexamining Sentencing Provisions 
Although not a direct effect on the public defender, a reduction in 
prison sentences would decrease the monetary burden on the state prison 
system, thereby creating a new source of money for the public defender’s 
use.283 A recent study conducted by Pew Charitable Trusts284 found that of 
30 states that engaged in some form of criminal justice reform since 2007, 
each saw a reduction in its corrections budget and total prison 
population.285 For example, South Carolina reduced the punishments for 
low-level drug offenses and saw a 25% decrease in prison population, a 
closure of six prisons, and $491 million in savings to taxpayers.286 
Louisiana must follow the lead of South Carolina and other states and 
continue to engage in criminal justice reform to reduce its massive prison 
population.287  
Louisiana has begun to follow South Carolina’s lead in the 2017 
criminal justice reform package, which involved reducing maximum 
sentences for several crimes.288 The package eliminated mandatory 
minimums on specific drug and property crimes and decreased other 
mandatory minimums.289 Nonviolent offenders saw a reduction in prison 
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sentences.290 Lawmakers substantially overhauled habitual offender 
laws.291 Although significant, this criminal justice bill must only be the 
start of reform in Louisiana, and reforming the criminal code should be an 
annual priority for the legislature.292 Louisiana should continue to reduce 
sentences for nonviolent and first-time offenders, easing the burden off the 
corrections system and allocating more money to the public defender.  
3. Better Access to Federal Grants 
In addition to broad criminal justice reform, Louisiana should make 
several administrative changes to indigent defense funding. First, the state 
public defender should efficiently utilize the resources the federal 
government provides, which involves training district public defenders to 
be aware of the availability of JAG grants.293 Second, Louisiana’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement should include district public defenders 
on its board to ensure that the interests of indigent defenders are 
adequately represented.294 To alter the makeup of the board, the legislature 
should amend the statute creating the LCLE to require parity of district 
defenders with district attorneys.295 A minor composition change will help 
ensure that the government distributes federal criminal justice grant 
money more equitably so that the prosecutor is not given a significant 
monetary advantage over the public defender.296 
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4. Tapping into Private Resources—the Right Way 
Louisiana has used private members of the bar for indigent defense 
since the decision in Gideon, and the state must continue to use this 
valuable resource;297 however, it should only use those lawyers of the 
private bar with a focus in criminal defense.298 In addition, the government 
should properly compensate and adequately train the private attorneys.299  
To encourage private bar participation, the state should offer tax 
incentives for attorneys who assist the public defender.300 This proposal 
would allow attorneys to take deductions on their income tax returns based 
on the hours worked representing the indigent.301 Louisiana ranks 12th 
among the 50 states in number of licensed attorneys per capita, thus, an 
attorney shortage is not a problem.302 Tax incentives have proven to spur 
action in Louisiana,303 and if used properly, such incentives could serve as 
an efficient tool in enlisting private attorneys to assist the public 
defender.304 
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In addition to members of the private bar, each of Louisiana’s four law 
schools should strive to develop an indigent defender clinical program 
dedicated to assisting the district defender in the school’s area.305 The 
clinic would benefit both the law student through invaluable experience, 
and the district defender, through free assistance.306 The law schools in 
Louisiana are charged with molding the minds of future lawyers, and 
schools must instill the value of pro bono service in law students, and 
specifically, the importance of adequately represented defendants, at the 
earliest stage.307 The Louisiana Legislature should implement these 
feasible criminal justice reform and administrative solutions to achieve a 
functioning indigent defense system. 
IV. I-N-D-E-P-E-N-D-E-N-T DO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS: 
 AN INDEPENDENTLY FUNDED STATE REVENUE STREAM308 
Louisiana must fundamentally change the way it funds indigent 
defense. The first step is to remove the user-pay system at the district level 
as the primary means of funding and replace it with a general revenue 
stream.309 Second, the Louisiana Legislature must allocate money in the 
state budget to pay for indigent defense through increases in excise taxes 
on alcohol and tobacco products and utilize savings from the criminal 
justice reform bill.310 Indigent defense in Louisiana will no longer survive 
on traffic tickets and conviction fees; in order to have lasting indigent 
defense funding in Louisiana, funding must be controlled at the state 
level.311  
A. State Revenue Stream 
Louisiana is the only state in the country to fund its public defenders 
primarily through conviction fees.312 The state must retire this archaic 
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system and replace it with a centralized state funding system.313 The 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”)314 
recently reported on the state of indigent defense funding in Louisiana, and 
its primary recommendations were to adopt state general revenue funding 
and increase funding to levels consistent with ABA workload standards.315 
Louisiana’s state general revenue funding derives from “taxes, licenses, 
fees, permits, rents and royalties, gaming revenues, interest on 
investments, proceeds from bond sales, and federal receipts.”316 The 
greatest sources of Louisiana’s general revenue are personal income taxes 
and state sales taxes.317  
The benefits of the state providing and controlling the funding for the 
public defender’s budget are stability and equality among all district public 
defenders in Louisiana.318 Instead of district defenders controlling varied 
and unreliable sources of court fines at the district level, the state public 
defender would ensure that each district received enough money based on 
the size and needs of the district.319 
The NACDL recommendation calculates a sufficient appropriation the 
state would need to meet ABA-approved standards.320 Full funding from 
the state would have to increase from the current $33 million supplement 
to $125 million, but the report notes this is a conservative estimate.321 The 
legislature must increase the state budget to fully fund indigent defense, 
but Louisiana has recently been plagued with significant budget deficits; 
thus finding the money for indigent defense is no easy task.322  
                                                                                                             
 313. Id. 
 314. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers is a professional 
bar organization and “is the preeminent organization in the United States 
advancing the mission of the nation's criminal defense lawyers to ensure justice 
and due process for persons accused of crime or other misconduct.” About 
NACDL, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. L., https://www.nacdl.org/about.aspx [https: 
//perma.cc/88ZB-6SZT] (last visited on Sept. 24, 2018).  
 315. Marsh, supra note 11, at 25; see supra Part III.A.2.  
 316. State and Local Government in Louisiana: An Overview, LA. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, 2A-1, (Oct. 2011), http://house.louisiana.gov/slg/PDF/Chapter 
%202%20Part%20A%20-%20State%20Government%20Finance,%20State%20  
Revenue%20Sources.pdf [https://perma.cc/K453-G756].  
 317. Id.  
 318. Marsh, supra note 11, at 25.  
 319. Id. at 26.  
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See generally id.; O’Donoghue, supra note 258.  
626 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
B. Funding the State Revenue Stream 
To implement the state general revenue stream, lawmakers first must 
address significant hurdles.323 The most identifiable hurdle to funding 
indigent defense through the state general revenue is locating the money 
to pay for the program.324 Louisiana is currently in the midst of the worst 
budget crisis the state has ever seen, with over a $1 billion budget gap.325  
Several options exist, however, to create a fully funded state indigent 
defense budget.326 First, the government should continue to collect district-
level criminal conviction fees into one account, which the LPDB can 
distribute evenly among the districts.327 Currently, the LPDB has no 
control over the district-level fines; if, however, all the fines were collected 
into one account, the government could distribute the money throughout 
the districts based on need.328 Second, Louisiana should consider raising 
the excise taxes on alcohol, gambling, and tobacco products because of the 
extra revenue those products generate and place that revenue into the 
state’s budget.329 Louisiana maintains one of the lowest alcohol taxes in 
the country.330 The per gallon tax rate on liquor in Louisiana is $3.03 
compared to the median in the United States of $3.75 per gallon.331 
Louisiana should raise excise taxes to create a stable source of funding for 
indigent defense. Finally, the Louisiana Legislature should use some of 
the savings generated by the criminal justice reform package to fund the 
indigent defense program.332 If the goal of the reform is to reduce the 
prison population, then investing in the justice system early on would 
certainly help.333  
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A potential drawback to the state general revenue stream is the 
LPDB’s over-centralization of power to dispense funds to the local district 
defenders.334 District defenders have long had a general distrust of the state 
public defender.335 The autonomy concern could be remedied by ensuring 
that the LPDB adequately represented the district public defenders. For 
example, the Louisiana Legislature could amend the LPDB composition 
bill to include local defender representation on the board in order for the 
district defenders to maintain an active role in funding the program.336 
Furthermore, the legislature could create certain safeguards to prevent the 
LPDB from arbitrarily spending money dedicated to indigent defense, 
such as itemized budgets for each district explaining the use of the money. 
Although the state general revenue stream faces potential problems, 
the value of restructuring and adequately supplementing the current user-
pay system with a stable source of funding will outweigh any potential 
drawbacks.337 A state general revenue stream is the best possible solution 
to Louisiana’s current indigent defense funding problem because the 
uneven collection of criminal conviction fees at the district level is 
insufficient to provide the indigent defendant with his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.338  
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana has consistently struggled to provide adequate indigent 
defense services, primarily because the state uses a district level user-pay 
system that causes instability and unreliability of the district defender’s 
annual budget.339 To remedy the funding problem, Louisiana must 
abandon the hybrid district and state model and fund the entirety of 
indigent defense through a state general revenue stream.340 The benefits of 
this general revenue stream include consistent funding throughout all 
judicial districts and state-based standards for all public defenders to 
follow.341 In addition, the state must pursue other feasible reforms, such as 
reclassifying certain nonviolent misdemeanors and lessening the burden 
on the criminal justice budget by reducing the length of sentences.342 
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Louisiana must continue the criminal justice reform progress that began in 
2017 by reforming the funding structure of the public defenders in order 
to create equal justice for all—including justice for Gregory Bright. 
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